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ANINTERPRETATION
We shall now attempt to interpret the statistical results, to uncover
their meaning by supplementing the statistics with an analytical
description of foreign lending. forces at work in the process
of credit deterioration are often dealt with under the elusive title
of 'optimism'. However, this is no more than a label and tells little
about what really goes on. We shall try to dig a bit deeper and to
reveal the interplay of factors hidden behind 'optimism'.
Though our analysis is confined to foreign loans and to a short
period its relevance need not end there.results may well reveal
some features of credit expansion in general. If so, it may con-
tribute to the understanding of business
1ThePicture of Change
THEEARLY DAYS
The early part of the period under review begins with the end of
World War I. No exact date canbeset for the end of this period
or the beginning of the 'late period'. It depends upon the particular
borrower and lender in question. 1920-24 may be called
the early period, 1925 brought the transition, and 1926-29 may
be called the late period.
Even the very firststepin the processofforeign lending, trivial
as it may seem, is symptomatic, because the procedure waslater
entirely reversed, as we shall see. "...itwas customary. ..inthe
The following is based in part on hearings held by the Senate Committee on
Finance, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., on the 'Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in
the United States' from December 18, 1931 to February 10, 1932. Officials
and partners of leading investment banking houses, government officials and
financial experts testified at these hearings and submitted data on foreign
loans. Various reforms were later made in part by individual bankers on their
own initiative and in part by government regulation. In particular the invest-
ment banking business was restricted to firms affiliated with commercial
banks.
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early days...forthe Government to entrust to some individual
in the country concerned the task of coming to New York and
negotiating the loan for the province, state, or municipality
the individual concerned was told by the finance minister... to
see what he could do toward getting a loan...•"2
In New York it was not easy for the agents of foreign countries
to obtain a loan. Many were unsuccessful. Many bankers "declined
to have anything to do with this matter. And it was a very difficult
business".3 If a banker was disposed to grant a loan he would
weigh the risk carefully and come to a decision slowly.
Once a banker undertook to float a foreign loan he had to con-
vince the public of its safety. "And it took... aprocess of enlight-
enment and explanation, for instance, to point out why the obliga-
tion of the French Government... wasabsolutely good..
.
Thepublic did not know much about foreign countries or cities.
For example, "... atthat time the City of Christiania [Oslo] was
very little known here, and a great deal of work had to be done
in explaining it, in sending out literature, and so forth."5 "And
it was a most difficult business because a good many people in
our country did not know where Hungary was. We published
books with pictures... wehad a regular campaign in order to let
the public know the circumstances. We got some men to make
speeches and to explain to the people what the purpose of the
loan was. It was quite a campaign.."°
The necessity for propaganda made the loans more expensive
to float and increased the spread, the difference between the price
paid the issuer and the price paid by investors, the issuing banker
had to charge. The spread was widened further by the riskiness
of the business for the banker, owing to the uncertain saleability
of the bonds. Again and again at the hearings held by the Senate
Finance Committee in 1932 the bankers were asked why the
2Fromthe testimony of Henry C. Breck, partner, J. and W. Seligman & Co.,
Hearings, p. 1307.
James Speyer of Speyer & Co., ibid., p. 618.
W. Lamont of J. P. Morgan & Co., ibid., p. 20.
Otto H. Kahn, member of the banking house of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., ibid.,
p. 126.
'Mr. Speyer, ibid., p. 616.AN INTERPRETATION 65
spread had to be so high at first and could be so much reduced
later. The answer was always: "... wehad to have a larger
spread in the early postwar years...." becausewe risked being
unable to sell the bonds and because our' selling costs were high.
Yields too, of course, had to be highorder to win over the
reluctant investing public.
Thus in the early days a borrower had to seek out a banker who
would be willing to lend. The banker in turn had to convince the
investing public of the high quality of the bonds he wanted to
sell. And the resistance of both banker and public had to be over-
come by high yields and large spreads.
THE LATE PERIOD
In the late period this process was reverse4 from the very first step.
The borrower no longer sends his manNew York; now the
New York banker sends his to foreign capitals.
The testimony at the Senate hearings in 1931-32 is enlightening.
Senator Johnson: "... youreversed the processes of the ordinary
mode of conducting a banking business; had in these last few
years the lenders going to the borrowers. ..?"Frederick Strauss,
partner, J. & W. Seligman & Co.: "Yes, sir." Senator: "And in
that fashion they accelerated, stimulated, increased loans of various
political subdivisions, Governments, industrial enterprises, and the
like; is not that correct?" Mr. Strauss: "That was the effect of it;
yes."7 James C. Corliss, then specialist, Latin American Finance,
Department of Commerce, also describes how a great many rep-
resentatives of American financial houses tried to get loans in a
number of countries. The bankers' agents not only tried to nego-
tiate given loans but used high pressure to find bor-
rowers. Mr. Corliss: "There was very keen competition in a great
many countries for those loans." Senator: "Will you explain what
you mean by keen competition. ..?"Mr. Corliss: "At one time
in Colombia there were something like 29 representatives, I was
told."8 The competition was brought out by other witnesses as
well. Senator: "Were there others who competing with you
for the loan there?" F. J. Lisrnan: understood there were
Ibid., p.1324. Ibid., p.845-6.66 CHAPTER 6
several banking houses there." Senator: "All of them trying to
get the loan from the Peruvian Government?" Mr: Lisman: "As
usual.Senator:That is so all over Latin Anienca? Mr. Lis-
man: "It was so during the period from 19 25-28, all over, I would
say."° The scope of this development was indicated in another
exchange. Senator: "There were many firms...whohad their
agents and their representatives in different places in Latin Amer-
ica seeking to obtain governmental loans...isnot that true?" Mr.
Strauss: "Yes; but it is also true that those things existed not only
in Latin America, but the world over..
.
Thislast remark is confirmed by Mr. Lamont in a speech in
1927: "I have in mind the reports that I have recently heard of
American bankers and firms competing on almost a violent scale
for the purpose of obtaining loans in various foreign money mar-
kets overseas. Naturally it is a tempting thing for certain of the
European Governments to find a horde of American bankers sit-
ting on their doorsteps offering them money....Thatsort of
competition tends to insecurity and unsound practice."1
Oliver C. Townsend, Commercial Attache at Lima, Peru, from
[926 to 1929 reveals something of the climate of loan negotiations
Df this period and of the "general promotion atmosphere" in a
memorandum dated February 10, 1927 to the United States Am-
bassador to Peru: "Tuesday night's dinner, given at the Hotel
Bolivar by S. A. MacGinnis to fifty-odd guests, was a fair sample.
of what the local society folk are treated to at rather close inter-
vals, namely, entertainment by promoters....Ourhost ...is
here with a big entertainment fund in the interest of...a
New York banking firm, to bid on the securities shortly to be
issued. •"12
The keen competition for loans led to bribery and commissions
for all who helped or claimed they helped to obtain them. Yet the
bankers' spread dropped considerably because selling costs declined
Frederick J. Lisman, F. J. Lisman & Co., ibid., p. 1775.
10Ibid.,pp. 1323-4. For a lively description of competition among bankers for
foreign loans and other aspects of unwise lending, see Max Winkler, op. cit.,
Ch. IV and V.
in the Hearings, p. 25. Ibid., p. 1611.AN INTERPRETATION 67
sharply and there was little risk of getting stuck with the bonds.
Selling bonds wasnolonger a For instance, the spread
declined from 61/2 to 5'/2 points between March and December
1927 for Peruvian bonds; from 13 to 8 points between 1925 and
1927 for two loans to Cauca Valley, Cçlombia. "At that period,
say, from 1924 to and including 1928, the bond market was ex-
tremely eager and very receptive, for bonds especially those yield-
ing high rates of interest. .
.
Everyaspect of foreign lending had changed. Senator: "The
last few years of your business are not comparable with the kind
of business or the mode in which you conducted your business in
prior years?" Mr. Strauss: "That is true, Senator." "... the
point you are making is about the methods, the change
that has come about. It would not have been natural 10 or 20
years ago."14
Thus, in the late period the lender sought out the borrower,
offering every conceivable concessionattract him. The public
in turn was no less eager to take the bonds from the bankers than
the bankers were to find borrowers.
Comparing the two periods we find the characteristics typical
of a change from a buyers' to a sellers' market, where the buyers
correspond to the lenders and the sellers to the borrowers: de-
pressed prices, high quality of goods, high selling costs in the
former; high prices, low quality of goods, low selling costs in the
latter. The deteriorating quality of loans fits perfectly into the
general picture.
The situation would have been much worse had not part of
the banking community resisted the temptation of easy profits and
preferred fewer rather than low quality bonds, as was shown in
the analysis of individual banking firms in Chapter 4. In this
connection the testimony of Grosvenor M. Jones, then Chief,
Finance and Investment Division, Department of Commerce, is
of interest. Senator: "During the last few years ...investment
houses and the like have indulged in the keenest competition to
obtain from the South American and from Latin
America the securities for flotation in this country, have they not?"
18Mr.Kahn, ibid., p.394.
14Ibid.,pp.1323and 1325.68 CHAPTER 6
Mr. Jones: "In general, I think there are two notable exceptions."
Senator: "Two notable exceptions. I think, in justice to those two,
we ought to state them." Mr. Jones: "I will not say that they are
the only exceptions; but J. P. Morgan and Co., and Kuhn, Loeb
and Co. have followed, more or less, the English tradition of the
borrower seeking the lender rather than the lender seeking the
borrower."15 This agrees with the statistical findings. The two
banking houses Mr. Jones names are the only ones that reduced
their lending in the second half of the period; moreover, their
default indexes are the second and the third lowest of the group
investigated (Ch. 4).
2 Analysis of Change
Though the world situation at the time might lead one to suppose
it, pressure on the part of borrowers was not a reason for the
deterioration of loans.'6 In the 2,000 odd pages of the Senate
Hearings foreign political pressure, propaganda, or bribery to in-
duce American bankers to grant an increasing volume of loans is
not mentioned once, but there are numerous accusations against
American bankers of having used such means to force loans on
foreign countries.
Is the explanation of the deterioration of the quality of credit
simply that early borrowers had an opportunity during the favor-
able twenties to get their finances into shape to withstand serious
depression, while late borrowers were caught in the depression
before they had a chance to put their house in order? Such an
argument implies that a major part of 'bad' loans was used to
fortify initially weak economies of debtor countries. But such was
not the case. The Latin American economies emerged from World
War I greatly strengthened; their loans were not needed for res-
toration or recovery, nor used to build up resistance against depres-
sion. German and eastern European debtors were in a different
Ibid., pp. 742-3.
10Seeour interpretation of foreign loan cycles (Ch. 1) which also suggests that
forces arising here rather than abroad were decisive in foreign lending.
The picture confirms also what we would expect in theory. An increasing
volume of loans accompanied by rising prices to lenders means that the
demand curve, representing in this case the lenders, must have shifted to the
right.AN INTERPRETATION 69
situation. But in view of their economic policies in general and the
improvident use they frequently madetheir loans, it is hard
to believe that the lapse of a few more years would have put them
in a position where they could have avoided default. Indeed, one
might well argue that the longer some debtors were able to borrow
the less were they prepared for a reversal of economic conditions.
The invalidity of the argument that late borrowers were at a
disadvantage when the depression came and that this was itself
the cause of the high rate of defaults is demonstrated by the recent
history of foreign bonds. As we noted above, despite war pros-
perity and greatly increased dollar exports all South American
countries in default in 1937 were still in default in 1949. Certainly,
their present default cannot be explained by their having borrowed
too late in the twenties. Nor can the maintenance of full service
by Belgium, France, Norway despite war damage be
ascribed to their having borrowed early in the twenties.
The high proportion of defaulted loans among issues of the
late twenties is not a necessary consequence of their date of issue.
To understand the deterioration we must know why the propor-
tion of loans that went to borrowers pronç to default rose.
It would be in line with the theory of an increasing shortage of
investment opportunities to suggest that 'there are just so many
good loans' and, therefore, a surplus of funds can only
be employed in making unsound ones. At blush this reasoning
seems quite plausible. It might be elaborated along these lines:
After World War I nations that had formerly exported capital
needed loans for a short while. These were the sound loans of
the first period. Later these nations became able once more to
take care of their own needs and even to regain their former posi-
tion as capital exporters, driving the United States as the youngest
among the lending nations into the least desirable markets.
Convincing as this may sound, the evidence is against it. When
investors are confronted with a lack of sound investment oppor-
tunities for their accumulating funds, the pressure on the market
for high-grade bonds drives their prices up. To the individual
investor, 'scarcity of sound loans' can mean only that their prices
are so high as to make investment in riskier but cheaper bonds70 CHAPTER 6
seem preferable. If, on the contrary, prices of riskier investments
rose more than those of low risk investments, we can hardly say
that lack of the latter forced investors into the former.
What are the facts in our case? Basic yields on 30-year bonds,
which may be regarded as representative for the high-grade domes-
tic bond market, declined from 4.50 to 4.05 percent between 1925
and 1928. In other words, the 'lack of sound loans' meant that the
investor had to accept a 10 percent decline in yield. Let us com-
pare developments in the market for foreign bonds. In 1925 the
average risk premium for foreign issues, 30 percent of which sub-
sequently proved unsound, was 2.18 percent. In 1928 a crop of
foreign bonds, 65 percent of which were failures, could be sold to
yield not more than a 2.00 percent risk premium. Thus investors
accepted an 8 percent reduction in risk premium for a much riskier
investment at the very time they accepted only a 10 percent reduc-
tion of yields on high-grade investments of constant quality. Prices
of risky foreign bonds, in other words, rose relatively more than
prices of high-grade domestic bonds. Hence it cannot be said that
investors were 'forced' to resort to risky investments.
High-grade foreign loans might have been expanded if Amen-
can investors had accepted a more drastic cut in their yields. For
instance, the shrinkage in the volume of Canadian loans when
total foreign lending reached its peak can probably be attributed
to unfavorable conditions for low risk investment in the United
States. The public's demand for high yielding bonds excluded
borrowers who offered lower yields. To a certain extent the lower
grade bonds drove the high-grade bonds from the market.
Lack of good loans cannot account for the mounting proportion
of mistakes. Another element is necessary to understand what hap-
pened: the delusions of the investors concerning the safety of their
loans. Investors bought low-grade bonds because they were not
aware of the risks they were incurring and it was their mistaken
judgment that kept the prices of high-grade bonds relatively low.
These delusions cannot be attributed to the influence of a few
fraudulent investment bankers, as has sometimes been suggested.
Their roots were deeper and can be understood only by consider-
ing the entire economic climate of the 1920's.AN INTERPRETATION
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The most important single factor leading investors to be less
cautious was the complete absence of defaults on foreign govern-
ment bonds during this entire period. In the early years few un-
sound loans had been issued and even
themild contractions of the 1920's. (li1 this respect the
severe depression of 1920-2 1 was no different from the later mild
ones; at this time, of course, American bankers had only just
begun to lend abroad.) The partial character of liquidation of
unsuccessful investments during several successive mild contrac-
tions has often been regarded as one of the causes of the ensuing
severe depression. In foreign loans there was not even a partial
'liquidation'. Whatever errors were made! did not become appar-
ent and bad risks accumulated through the decade. The confidence
of bankers and public grew as time passed and no losses were
incurred.
Another factor that bred illusions was the considerable profit
made by a great number of investors during a long period. More-
over, these gains furnished funds for more investment of the same
kind. The longer this period of gains and no losses
lasted, the more were people inclined to believe there was no end
in sight. The growing distance from the last severe depression
dimmed their memory of past catastrophies. Even those who were
cycle-conscious were reassured by the mild contractions of the
1920's, which passed without inflicting losses on foreign bond-
holders and left the impression that depressions were a
thing of the past, something that had overcome. The very
absence of a severe depression over such a long period might have
caused apprehension. But it had the opposite effect: the longer a
telling depression was avoided the greater the confidence in the
future became. This is not to say that every banker or investor
shared these views but overconfidencethe tone.
These delusions had of course a cumulative effect. The new
lending they encouraged was used to pay old debts when other
funds were not available, thereby prolonging the life of bad debt-
ors, postponing defaults, and in turn adding to the delusions.
What was the American government's role in all this? Was it
more foresighted than bankers and investors? According to James72 CHAPTER 6
W. Angell, the government "has influenced the course of inter-
national finance in an extraordinarily wide variety of ways."7
Did this influence contribute to or mitigate the decline in loan
quality? Concerning the impact of government policies on Latin
American, Canadian and Far Eastern loans, Angel! comes to the
following conclusion: "Undoubtedly, the great majority of the
present American commitments in these regions, made chiefly since
the war, would have been effected even had the government re-
mained entirely passive. The war left the United States, for a
number of years, as the only large source of exportable capital to
which the rest of the world could turn. No action by the United
States Government was needed to induce American business men
to reach for the commercial and financial opportunities created by
this situation."18
It seems probable that capital exports would on the whole have
been smaller without the government's encouragement, though in
a few cases the government placed an embargo on capital exports.
But whether more sound or unsound loans were promoted we do
not know.
3 Role of the Banking Houses
As the decision of the issuing banker is directly responsible for each
loan we can begin to describe his role by analyzing this decision
and its motivation. The business of the banker is to lend. The driv-
ing force in his decisions is the prospect of profits. But to protect
the goodwill of his firm he must refrain from business that might
entail losses for his customers. Every loan decision is the outcome
of a process of weighing these conflicting motives against each
other. Banks are the apparatus designed to do this weighing. In
our case this apparatus worked well for a while; the restraining
force of risk was strong enough to prevent mistakes except for
a small percentage of loans. This same apparatus functioned
much less well in the late twenties as the restraining force of risk
declined.
uFinancialForeign Policy of the United States (A Report to the Second In-
ternational Studies Conference on the State and Economic Life, London, 1933.
Prepared for the American Committee appointed by the Council on Foreign
Relations, 1933), p. 123.
Ibid., p. 98, italics mine.AN INTERPRETATION 73
Confining our discussion to two factors in the bankers' decisions,
risk andprofit,is not to deny the of others. Undoubtedly
a few loans were floated in deference to the wishes of the American
government; others were granted the bankers hoped to
win the favor of the government of a country where they had other
large investments; personal relations with foreign bankers may
occasionally have had some influence; and so forth. But considera-
tions of this kind operated only in isolate4 cases and were neither
general nor powerful enough to explain the drastic deterioration
in loan quality during the 19 20's.
a) BANKING ESTIMATES OF RISK19
Without attempting a complete enumeration, we wish to give a
general idea of the large number of factors bankers considered in
estimating the soundness of a loan. The that most private
bankers lacked information about their debtors and that the quality
of credit could have been markedly improved if loans had been
investigated more carefully does not seem to be supported by the
facts. We do not find evidence that bankers were generally ignorant
of the factors considered relevant for the soundness of loans. These
are some of the factors the bankers took into consideration:
1) The political situation: prospects of peace or war, stability of
the foreign government, relations the United States and
the debtor country, etc. 2) Character of the borrowing nation: its
willingness to make sacrifices in order to pay its debts. This is
important because some nations take advantage of any pretext to
avoid paying which, since it is not feasible to force payment of
foreign debts, is as bad as incapacity to pay. Other nations, on the
contrary, go to great lengths to pay their debts. 3) The general
economic situation of the debtor countrSr: This would involve a
careful analysis of: "Its past debt record....Itsrecord of income
and expenditures for a period of from 510 years preceding the
time at which the loan is being considered, and its budget for
the succeeding year or two years. Its import and export statistics
for the past 5 or 10 years and an analysis of its 'invisible' trade,
if any. Its national debt both on a total and a per capita basis.
"'Risk' always means risk of default, not the the banker runs of not being
able to sell the issue.74 CHAPTER 6
Its national wealth. Its fiscal position as to its holdings of gold or
the gold holdings of its central bank in relation to its outstanding
currency....Valueof its actual or potential trade with the
United States.•
•
Thispoint, the economic position of the nation, was usually
deemed to be the most important factor even when the loan was
granted to a private borrower.21
4) The particular economic position of the borrowing corpora-
tion :22 "First we make a detailed study...ofthe following:
Nature and scope of the company's activity. Territory served.
Property and business. ..Competition...Publicrelations. Gov-
ernmental and State regulation. Possibilities of future growth.
Second, a study of ownership and management of the company.
Third, a detailed study of an examination and appraisal of prop-
erties by independent American engineers. Fourth, a detailed study
of examination and audit of earnings and balance sheet position
of the company, covering a period of years, by American certified
public accountants. Fifth, a detailed study of various legal aspects
of the situation investigated by our counsel..
On the points mentioned under 1-4 bankers collected informa-
tion in various ways. The Department of Commerce bulletins
which were based on reports by foreign service officers of the gov-
ernment were widely used. Many bankers sent experts into the
borrowing countries, consulted with bankers of these countries, and
checked their conclusions against the opinions of such experts as
S. Parker Gilbert, Agent General for Reparation Payments, and
Hjalmar Schacht,24 or against the attitude of England and Hol-
land, as the older lender nations.
5) Terms of the loan: many bankers thought the safety of a loan
could be increased by inserting certain provisions in the contract.
For example, the League of Nations loans contained far-reaching
Memorandum from Kuhn, Loeb & Co., Hearings, p. 293.
See, for instance, Mr. Lamont, ibid., p. 48.
This factor is not without bearing on our analysis because the bonds investi-
gated include government guaranteed corporate issues.
E. C. Granberry, Vice Chairman, Board of Directors, Chase, Harris, Forbes
Corporation; ibid., p. 526.
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provisions to ensure their safety: guarantees by several other na-
tions; priority over all other obligations; the obligation of the
debtor nation to balance its budget and provisions for financial
control to enforce this.
I
Sometimesthe borrowing country pledged a certain source of
revenue as security for the service of the ican or the loan was paid
in instalments each of which was contingent upon the maintenance
of a balanced budget,25 or the country simply promised to balance
its budget.
In order to increase the safety of a loan the bankers sometimes
stipulated that it should be used for specific productive pur-
pose yielding a revenue that would ensure its service. Some con-
tracts went so far as to provide for over the expenditure
of the money; e.g., in Cuba the money was not paid to the govern-
ment at all but directly to the contractors against certificates of
work done; i.e., it was not available for other purposes.26
This recital may suffice to illustrate the variety of factors the
bankers said they examined and on which they based their judg-
ments of the safety of their loans. Their contention is well sup-
ported. Most convincing are the statements by witnesses at the
Senate Hearings who otherwise criticized the bankers.
They do not charge that loans were issued in ignorance of the
relevant facts; on the contrary, they charge that the bankers were
aware of unfavorable circumstances yet issued loans anyway. The
declaration of the Committee on Banking and Currency that the
bankers "failed to examine, or only perfunctorily, eco-
nomic conditions in foreign countries" seems hardly justified.27
Ignorance was not in general the cause of the mistakes in foreign
lending.
But if all the circumstances of the loan, the debtor, his country,
and the world in general were taken into account, why did the
See, for instance, ibid., pp. 1649 if.
"Wedid feel an added security in the fact that the moneys we provided would
be paid over to the construction contractors themselves. ..." A.M. Williams,
of Rushmore, Bisbee & Stern, Attorneys for the Chase National Bank, ibid.,
p. 1964.
StockExchange Practices, Report of the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 73rd Cong., 1934, Senate Report No. 1455, p. 126.76 CHAPTER 6
correctness of the bankers' judgment vary so much over time? Why
was it sound on the whole at one time and wide of the mark at
another? Evidently differences in interpretation of the facts are
responsible. The most detailed study of the position of a debtor
informs us only about his past and present. It is when we project
into the future that we are likely to make mistakes. And if more
mistakes are made at one time than at another, projecting into
the future must be easier and thus more reliable at some times
than at others.
In the first part of our period when the world was gradually
recovering from World War I it was conservative to expect this
to continue for some time. But in the later period of rapid expan-
sion it was reckless to project the favorable trends into the future.
This, however, was precisely what many bankers did.
An example will illustrate how careful information led to wrong
conclusions because the banker expected current trends to con-
tinue into the future and disregarded inflationary conditions. To
show the soundness of Peru's economy a banker reasoned: "After
these bonds were issued. .. thetotal annual service charges on the
external funded debt amounted to approximately 20 percent of
the average ordinary revenues for the preceding three years (1925,
1926 and 1927)....ThePeruvian Government's ordinary reve-
nues for 1928 were 20 percent greater than for 1926, and the
excess of its expenditures. .. oversuch revenues was substantially
less than for 1926. Exports were 31 percent greater, the excess of
exports over imports 215 percent greater, the production of cotton
2 percent greater, sugar 4 percent less, copper 21 percent greater
and petroleum exports 6 percent greater than in 1926....As
important as, if not more important than, the then favorable cur-
rent position of Peru were the trends during a period of years.
These trends were favorable, too, as indicated by the fact that
between 1913 and 1926 ordinary revenues of the Government had
increased 186 percent, exports 162 percent, the excess of exports
over imports 45 percent. •
•
Thebankers apparently took little account of the probability
that these 'favorable trends' were unlikely to continue when, as
Statement of J. & W. Seligman & Co.; Hearings, pp.2118-9.AN INTERPRETATION 77
in this case, they were based on an enormous expansion of bank
credit. Some bankers even evolved a formula that implied the
assumption of continued inflation. "They said that if loan charges
were covered three times by revenues then the loan was sound."29
But revenues of a country that borrows heavily do not indicate its
future ability to pay.
There were exceptions, of course. Some bankers judged the
situation correctly and refrained from lending to countries where
inflationary conditions prevailed.30 A few even went so far as to
warn their colleagues. For instance, in 1927 Mr. Lamont warned
against "indiscriminate lending and inciiscriminate borrowing".81
Experts too raised their voices. In his 'memorandum of 1927 on
reparations, for instance, S. Parker Gilbert brought together "the
accumulating evidences of overspending and overborrowing on
the part of the German public authorities, and some of the indica-
tions of artificial stimulation and overexpansion that are already
manifesting themselves". He concluded: "These tendencies, if
allowed to continue unchecked, are almost certain ... tolead to
severe economic reaction and depression.
Occasionally a warning came from the borrowing countries
themselves: "... thepresident of the Feserve Bank of Peru
came up to New York, and told the bankers that they were lending
far too much, and that they should at least cut their loans in half.
That was in 1927, before they made their first loan."88
Yet most of these warnings were in more or less general terms
and were often dismissed as not applying to the particular loans
bankers were about to make. Their attitude may seem somewhat
surprising since, logically, we would expect their caution to grow,
instead of decrease, with the distance from the last severe depres-
sion. Their awareness that loans are tested in times of severe depres-
sion and that the absence of defaults at other times does not prove
Lawrence Dennis, connected with J. & W. Seligman & Co., 1928-30, ibid.,
p. 1591.
This is one important source of differences between default indexes of indi-
vidual banks; see Ch. 4.
Hearings,p. 25.
12Ibid.,p. 897; cf. also Max Winkler, Op. Cit.
"LawrenceDennis, Hearings, p. 1601.78 CHAPTER 6
that all loans are sound should have functioned as a brake, on the
over-optimism of the public. This it did, to some degree. But to a
large extent the bankers were influenced by current favorable as-
pects of economic developments. The spell of the long defaultiess
period made them forget that "During the nineteenth century every
major downward swing of the business cycle caused the failure of
governments and other foreign borrowers to meet their external
obligations".84 Or, if the disasters of the past were remembered
they were discounted in the belief that modern economic policy
wasableto prevent severe depressions, a belief strengthened by
the mildness of recent contractions. A reversal of favorable trends
was feared less rather than more as time wore on and current
trends were confidently projected into the future. As world condi-
tions improved, expectations grew more and more optimistic, i.e.,
more and more incorrect. Thus the bankers' estimates of risk were
an important factor in the decline of loan quality.
b) THE IMPORTANCE OF RISK
Another possible source of variation in the quality of loans is the
different weight bankers place upon risk at different times. To
determine the role of risk in the decisions of bankers let us listen
first to what they themselves say. They are virtually unanimous
that no banker ever issued a loan he did not consider safe: Mr.
Strauss: "...we have never brought out a bond issue that we did
not believe at the time was a safe investment; ... noloans were
undertaken, in spite of the madness that you speak of, that were
not believed to be safe." Mr. Lamont: "... wenever issue a bond
unless we believe it to be good." Mr. Kahn: "...Ican say for
my house that for every issue that we made we declined six others,
or probably more, because we always want to be sure that what
we offer is intrinsically sound. ..." Mr.Lamont: "...itwas a
very attractive investment. That is, if you had faith in the future
of the country. And if you did not, it would not be attractive on
any basis."85
The bankers stress also their lasting interest in their bonds. Sena-
tor: "...and have you any further interest in those bonds?" Mr.
"Madden et al., op. cit., p. 107.
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Kahn: "We have an interest in those bonds until they are repaid
according to their due date. We consider that we are under a
permanent moral liability to do what we can for the protection of
those bonds."36 Mr. Granberry: "...in case a bond is in default
quite naturally the original issuing houses or houses as the case may
be, use their best efforts, and both time and money, to try to cor-
rect the default and make the bond good." Senator: "You do
not mean to say that you put your capital into defaulted interest
or principal of bonds. Mr. Granberry: We put our money more
or less into defaulted situations to trymake them good."37 Mr.
Speyer: "And that responsibility on for 20 or 30 years.
•..Thesums of money that we spend in looking after these things,
and trying to straighten them out, nobody knows anything
about."38 And again Mr. Kahn: issuing house considers it
its responsibility to do everything in its power to reconstitute and
reestablish the solvency and the good credit of the property, to
protect the bondholders ... togive its efforts, its experience, its
ability fairly and properly to deal wilh the situation which a
default has created."3°
A banker has good reason to examine carefully what he sells
and to try to protect his customers frpm losses. "The banker's
prosperity, indeed his very existence, depends on the confidence of
the public. If he has not got that ...hisbusiness will shrink to
negligible proportions, if not fail completely. Confidence... must
be acquired every day by the way you conduct your business. ..
Offew goods is the buyer less able to gauge the true value than
of foreign bonds. He must rely largely upon the banker's reputa-
tion, on his 'ethical trade mark' which, therefore, will be more
important to the banker's business e.g., that of a shoe dealer's
to his.
Even more convincing than the banker's testimony or our rea-
soning about the role of safety are the facts mentioned in the pre-
ceding section, i.e., the great trouble and expense to which bank-
ers go to assure themselves that their loans are sound.
Of course, the importance attached to risk varies greatly from
"Ibid.,p.135. Ibid., p.128.
Ibid., p.519. 4° Mr.Kahn, ibid., p.352.
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one banking firm to another.4' The better the name of a firm, the
more reason it has to protect it. A new firm may be more likely to
try to 'make hay while the sun shines'. And in addition to the
banker's self-interest his feeling of social responsibility will, to a
larger or smaller degree, impel him to look to the safety of his
loans.
Does the power of risk as a brake vary over time? That may
depend upon the strength of the factor discussed in the next sec-
tion: public demand for foreign issues.
4 The Demand of the Public
a) WHO IS 'THE PUBLIC'?
We know little about investors in foreign bonds. In the opinion of
Dwight W. Morrow "The person who invests in foreign bonds is
probably the same person who invests in domestic bonds".42 But
this does not tell us much and may not be altogether correct.43
The attitudes of individual investors differ widely and vary con-
tinuously. Some would not touch foreign bonds under any circum-
stances ('isolationist investors'), others buy only the issues of
countries that have proved to be reliable debtors, a third type
demands exceedingly high yields, and so forth. Demand for any
given loan at any given time will be the resultant of all these
tendencies.
There seem to have been no empirical investigations into the
type and number of foreign bond buyers except some on a very
small scale undertaken by Senator Morrow in 1927. His analysis
of the sales of 24 investment houses covering 5 foreign government
loans showed that more than 85 percent of the purchases were
in small amounts ranging from $100 to $5,000, and that approxi-
mately half of these 5 issues went to these small investors.44
Another bit of information can be gleaned from registrations of
bondholders with protective committees. The Foreign Bondhold-
ers Protective Council reports: "The Committee of Bondholders
for the Republic of Chile Bonds has included in the registrations
Differences in the regard for risk seem to be one of the chief reasons for the
wide differences between the default indexes of different banking houses (see
Ch. 4).
Who Buys Foreign Bonds? Foreign Affairs, January 1927.
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with that Committee individual bondholders, banks, trust funds,
schools, colleges, universities, theologiáal seminaries, churches,
church societies, libraries, hospitals, memorial homes, foundations,
orphanages, Y.M.C.A.'s, and cemetery associations. Every state
in the United States, one territory of the United States, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and thirty foreign countries are represented in
the registrations so far received. Whilenumber of the registrants
hold substantial amounts of bonds, average holding is very
small, showing an extremely wide distribution of these bonds...
the average holding of. ..96%of registrants is $800 worth of
bonds per person."45
Foreign security holders were estimated to exceed 1.5 million in
1932.46 The SEC has estimated that bet teen 600,000 and 700,000
investors held defaulted foreign bonds ip 1937. In any case there
seems to be general agreement that mLany small investors held
foreign bonds. Unlike the large investor, the small investor cannot
insure against losses by diversifying his investments. Moreover, he
will often be unable to wait and thus ultimately to recover all or
part of his loss. As he has to take his loss, his mistake or care-
lessness in purchasing a risky bond is relatively greater than would
be that of a big investor. I
b)WHY DOES THE PUBLIC BUY BONDS?
Why did large numbers of investors deem foreign bonds safe in-
vestments? Why were they so confident that a foreign country
or town, whose name they had hardly known a few months earlier,
would be willing and able to keep up the service of its loans for
20 or 30 years?
It has been said that "faith in the banker was the only meas-
uring rod for the investor"; that "Thdse bonds were bought by
Tom, Dick and Harry...withoutany reference to the solidity or
the solvency of the bonds...,butentirely on the faith of the
house issuing them in New York."47
Doubtless the bankers' confidence reinforced that of the public
and their propaganda influenced investors. But this is only part
of the story. Let us remember that this "faith in the banker" did
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Report, 1935, p. 99.
Charles E. Mitchell, Chairman, National City Bank, Hearings, p. 70.
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not always exist, that the public did not always buy everything
the bankers offered. In our description of the early period we
stressed the great efforts bankers made and the expenses they in-
curred in creating a market for foreign bonds. Evidently at that
time they could not rely on the public's faith and expect it to buy
whatever they offered. They had to refuse many transactions be-
cause they feared they would not be able to convince the public
of their safety and as a rule could float only sound issues with
relatively high yields.
Reliance on the banker was, then, itself the product of a certain
period. Why did the public trust its bankers precisely between
1925 and 1928? Why should thousands of individuals develop
such a curious unquestioning faith in bankers? The answer is that
the public's attitude was not due to any mysterious faith but was
caused by the very factors that determined the bankers' attitude.
And these factors swayed the public without being checked by
competence and responsibility. Investors in foreign bonds had not
suffered any losses for a long time; on the contrary, they had
repeatedly made sizable profits. This pleasant state came to be
regarded as normal; investors assumed the world had entered a
period of permanent defaultless prosperity.
Many events served to substantiate this belief. The League of
Nations and the Locarno Pacts seemed to open peaceful prospects.
Europe had recovered economically, runaway inflation had been
stopped in every country, currencies were stable. Confidence in
the world in general was the basis for the confidence of both
banker and investor.48
c) HOW DIDTHECHANGE IN THE PUBLIC'S ATTITUDE AFFECT THE
BANKERS?
Bankers base their expectations of demand on their own and their
colleagues' day to day experience. To foresee potential demand is
difficult when a country is taking its first steps in the international
This is shown also by the public's attitude toward other types of relatively
risky investment where reliance on the banker played a less important role,
e.g., domestic common stock issues. Plentiful credit and mistaken ideas about
the future raised the demand for riskier investments and as a result quality
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capital market or after a period of inactivity in the market. It is
easier and forecasts are more reliable when the bankers know how
the market reacted to similar loans a short time before. They
observe and base their judgment on significant symptoms, such
as the attitude of the bond market in general and in regard to the
bonds of the specific country, the possibility of catching a favor-
able moment, etc.
Prospect of sufficient demand is a prerequisite for floating a
loan. Therefore, the changed outlook of: the public, itself greatly
influenced by the bankers, had grave repercussions on the bank-
ers' position. We have seen above how: in the early twenties the
uncertainty of demand, investors' reluctance to buy, were con-
stantly on bankers' minds, and how this tended to discourage
flotations or caused extra outlay and trouble when an issue was
finally decided upon.
In the late period the bankers stress the influence of the public's
attitude on them more than anythingin their testimony.49 The
public's eagerness is mentioned again and again as the motive for
floating bonds. Senator: "Seeking in every way to obtain such
loans as you could for flotation here?" Mr. Lisman: "To satisfy
the public demand for securities."50 Senator: "What was it that
led to the extraordinarily keen competition among international
bankers for South American loans?" Mr. Breck: "I think it was
an appetite on the part of the Amerkan public to buy foreign
loans."5'
Country banks, tempted by high yields, acted like the general
public and considered the bonds "tosound and safe invest-
ments. ..." "Theywere anxious to take them. They asked for
them. These little bankers wanted to be in bond syndicates just
as the big bankers wanted to be, because 90 percent and more of
such syndicates at that time turned o4t to be profitable." They
*Thefluctuations in the volume of foreign loan flotations (see Ch. 1) indicate
that the public's attitude varied also within each period; that it was always
easier to sell foreign bonds in times of recession than in times of
expansion when domestic stocks absorbed more of the available funds. How-
ever, these shorter demand fluctuations within the early and within the late
period appear to have impressed the bankers far less than the big increase
in demand between the two periods.
Hearings, p. 1775. Ibid., p. 1321.